The League of Nations seemed destined to failure from the outset. Its Council could act only unanimously. Further, it was beset by a primary shortcoming implicit in its very nature: that it was not a world government, and not an international authority--but, rather, a kind of "club," consisting of a group of varied members, each with its own needs, desires, outlooks, and agendas. France regarded the League as a means of preserving the territorial settlement and arms restrictions thast were imposed upon Germany at the end of the War. Britain viewed it as a "meeting place" for the world's powerful nations. Russia disdained it as an "imperialist fraud."
But its most fatal flaw consisted of the fact that it was, as stated above, something less than a world government; and, as such, in possession of no real authority, no troops or weapons, and no power to compel any nation to come to the aid of another that was being attacked. In short, it was incapable of enforcing the collective security that it was founded to provide. Instead, it could only depend upon, and hope for, the cooperation of its members. And this cooperation was hard to come by; as fear of precipitation of the same conditions as existed before the War--i.e., the formation of secret alliances among groups of member nations--discouraged individual states from assisting in the enforcement of the League's Covenant.
The relative power of the individual nations involved in a dispute constituted another factor. For example, in 1923, the League lacked the muscle to put an end to France's occupation of the Ruhr when Germany complained about its reparation payments.
In this atmosphere of impotence, and absence of real effort on the part of Britain and the U.S., the League's attempts at conciliation frequently ended in failure. In such a case as this, the only alternative left to the organization was mere condemnation of the improper actions of this or that member--an alternative that constituted at best an empty gesture. Moreover, the absence of cooperation on the part of the most powerful nation-states, which so vastly limited the League's effectiveness, paved the way for travesties such as members attacking one another with little or no meaningful reaction on the part of the League itself. As an exanple, when Japan attacked China, in the early 1930s, the League could only recommend that Japan "withdraw her troops...." And when Italy attacked Ethiopa in 1936, the League once more did little to stop it.
In the end, the resurgence of aggressive nationalism, coupled with international economic maladjustments, served to create a final abandonment of any hope of success for the League.
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