LEGAL
Despite a limited number of instances of somewhat successful functioning, the problem with international tribunals has in the past appeared to be, and today continues to be, an inconsistency of recognition, and consequently of support. It is apparent that this is a natural effect of the fundamental property of international institutions to date: their having been created, composed, and subscribed to--not by a worldwide authority--but by a group of individual nation-states, in variously constituted combinations. Furthermore, such tribunals lack the power or apparatus to enforce their determinations; and must, instead, seek the cooperation of the affected parties.
Consider, if you would, as evidence of the first of these propositions, the lengthy saga concerning the United States' relations with said Court. Following World War I, and the beginning of the League of Nations, that organization's Covenant called for, among other things, the formation of an international court. Thus, in June of 1920, the Permanent Court of International Justice began operating at The Hague. It wasn't until January, 1926, that the U.S. Senate held a vote concerning the nation's joining this Court. Numerous objections were raised, reflecting reservations concerning America's membership, and consequent submission to its jurisdiction. Time moved on; and by 1927, the U.S. had still not joined. In December of that year, 395 world leaders wrote President Calvin Coolidge urging him to encourage our nation to become a member. Two years later, in December, 1929, a U.S. envoy in Geneva signed a document called the "Root Formula." The details of this are of little importance today; but its net effect was the fact that the U.S. had finally come around around to accepting membership in the World Court.
On the other hand, despite the encouragement implicit in this, numerous examples continue to appear in the Court's history--examples whose details are again no longer of importance--but which demonstrate the Court's lack of enforcement capability.
Another accomplishment of 1929 was the signing on behalf of forty eight nations of the Geneva Convention, regarding the treatment of prisoners of war. This was a worthy and noble step to be taken; and yet it is but one of many ironies concerning nation-states and the hostilities that arise among them. I cannot help but comment that it is shameful and sad to realize that we still live in a world wherein people from "place A" are one day declared, and thereby required to be, "enemies" of the people who reside within "place B;" and that they are therefore subject to being attacked, injured, or killed by people from "place B"--unless they are "captured" or otherwise surrender to the forces of "place B," thereby becoming their "prisoners," until the hostilities between "place A" and "place B" have been settled (for the time being). It is somewhat commendable that such an agreement was reached--in principle, although (note, for example, the notorious exceptions represented by Abu Ghraib) apparently not always in practice--concerning some elements of humane treatment which the "prisoners" from "place A" would be afforded by their captors from "place B."
In 1945, the United Nations-sponsored International Court of Justice replaced the Permanent Court of International Justice. It exists to this day; and it commands about the same degree of support and power as its predecessor.
The U.N. General Assembly commenced efforts to create a permanent international criminal court during the late 1980s. This was finally accomplished when, in 1998, representatives from 160 countries met in Rome, and agreed to the establishment of such a tribunal. It too would be located at The Hague. Its jurisdiction would be over individuals--not governments or nations--in regard to alleged crimes against humanity and gewnocide. It became an official tribunal in 2002, after ratification of the proposal for creating it was forthcoming from the required sixty nations; and it began operation in 2003. Noteworthy is the fact that the United States was not among the sixty. The reasoning behind said non-ratification, as subsequently expressed by President Bush, lay in the fact that the United States did not want its military and political decision-makers to be subject to appraisal by, and possibly prosecution on behalf of, other nations and their leaders. This is logical and sensible; and comprises another means of expressing the concept written a few paragraphs earlier, regarding the inherent weakness of international tribunals as they have been constituted to date: i.e., that they have been instituted by, composed of, and subscribed to, by a group of various insividual nation-states--rather than a single and solitary world authority.
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